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Abstract
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross Partial Own-
erships (CPO). We find conditions for stable equilibria in takeovers with the target being
inside or outside of a CPO arrangement. The impact of CPO upon profitability for the
raider, the target and the rest of the industry is two-sided in a Cournot setting and de-
pends on the value of CPO and on the type of target. CPO shows anticompetitive effects
by facilitating mergers in most cases. However, a protective threshold (takeover ratio<1)
exists below which CPO arrangements can reduce the incentives for a hostile takeover of a
targeted member of the CPO agreement. Further, even above this protective threshold CPO
may make hostile (protected) takeovers less profitable than a benchmark industry without
CPO (a result with potentially significant regulatory implications). An empirical applica-
tion showcases the potential relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across
different industries.
JEL Classification: G34 L22 L41
Keywords: Takeovers; Partial Ownership; Mergers; Market Power; Minimum Takeover Ratio
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1 Introduction
The analysis of takeovers incentives is generally associated with the “outsider effect” of mergers
(Salant et al, 1983). In a Cournot-organized industry, the benefits of staying outside of a merger
outweigh the gains of triggering a takeover. Others have confirmed this effect by deriving neg-
ative incentives to merge (Willig, 1991; Inderst and Wey, 2004). Partial ownership itself shows
anti-competitive effects similar to those of mergers such as output reduction, profit increase
and welfare losses (Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; Reitman, 1994). When associated with partial
ownership mergers and takeovers mostly rely on toeholds in the literature (see e.g. Choi, 1991;
Betton et al., 2009). In this case, an initial equity participation facilitates a complete acquisition
because it raises the cost of being outbid by a competitor (Bulow et al., 1999). The strategy
of acquiring a toehold raises antitrust issues as it is detrimental for consumers. However, it is
not accounted for by regulation agencies (Jovanovic and Wey, 2014). Jovanovic and Wey (2014)
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study the impact of an acquisition (with synergies) on the consumer surplus when preceded by
an initial ownership and show a post-merger improvement. Our paper completes this literature
by presenting a model where the target of a takeover can be a firm engaged in a cross partial
ownership with another firm, different from the acquirer. Our results (with no synergies in-
volved) demonstrate a disincentivising effect of CPOs leading to a more competitive industry
than in a traditional Cournot oligopoly.
CPO arrangements are common between horizontally competing firms on both side of the At-
lantic. Examples include Multi System Operators (MSOs) in the US such as Tele-Communications
Inc. (TCI), Turner Broadcasting Systems (TBS) and Time-Warner (see Table 1). In Europe
examples include BNP Paribas with UAP (AXA) in France and the multiple interlocks between
Dresdner Bank, Allianz and Munich Re in Germany (see Table 2).
Multi Time Warner TCI-TBS TCI - Seagram -
System - TBS (before Time Warner Time Warner
Operators merger) (after merger) (before) after merger
Partial 18% 22% 9% (15%) 10%
Ownerships
Table 1: Partial Ownerships in major communication networks in 1996 before and after the
merger of Time Warner and Turner. Source www.lesechos.fr.
Germany Munich Re-Allianz Deutsche Bank-Allianz Munich Re-Dresdner Bank
(2000) 20%-20% 7%-5% 2.3%-8.3%
France UAP-BNP ELF-Renault ELF-BNP
(1994) 10%-10% 4%-1.5% 2%-1%
Table 2: Example Cross Partial Ownerships in Germany and France. Source www.lesechos.fr.
In a homogeneous Cournot industry we are able to determine the profitability of a takeover
as a function of the endogenous parameters (CPO and the number of firms). We explore the
implications of CPO for takeover profitability. We introduce the concept of partial ownership as
a defence against hostile takeover by allowing two cases (see Definition 2, in Section 3) with two
different takeover targets. Exploring asymmetric CPOs allows us to obtain competitive results
on takeover incentives that are markedly different to the traditional model of mergers within a
Cournot oligopoly (Tirole, 1988). We show that CPO increase incentives for takeovers in most
cases. However in the protected case, CPO arrangements can be constructed to reduce the
incentives to raid the protected firm. Firstly, we demonstrate that CPO reduces the incentives
to merge relative to a benchmark industry without CPO. Secondly, in certain circumstances,
even greater levels of protection may be possible. If the minimum takeover ratio is less than 1 a
protective CPO threshold can be constructed that reduces incentives to raid the protected firm.
This highlights the anticompetitive effect of CPO by making the target less desirable in reducing
the overall profitability of the merger. This protective CPO threshold can be defined in terms
of the endogenous parameters (the other CPO and the number of firms in the industry) and
constitutes an important finding in this study. Thus, in both cases, CPO constitutes a defence
in participations against hostile takeovers.
CPO may have regulatory implications for competition policy as they improve social welfare.
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In addition, governments willing to protect strategic sectors from hostile takeovers could use a
defence in participations. Indeed, the use of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers has been
implemented both in Europe (“golden shares”) and in the US (see e.g. Lantenois, 2011; Yergin
and Stanislaw, 1998; Goldstein, 1996). Finally, we discuss three decisions of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) related to the use CPO by governments to block foreign investment in strategic
sectors. The ruling of the ECJ against these protective polices based on free market “laissez-
faire” arguments is thus criticized as CPOs may prove socially more beneficial than traditional
competition frameworks.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on partial ownership.
Section 3 outlines the model used. Section 4 highlights the key analytical results obtained.
Section 5 discusses an empirical application which allows comparison of the theoretical protective
threshold to real-world CPO arrangements. The results of our model can hence be shown to
have empirical relevance for real-world CPO arrangements. Section 6 provides information to
European regulators about the positive social impact of CPO in the context of mergers. We
thus highlight an important trade-off between a free-market and an interventionist approach.
Section 7 concludes and discusses the opportunities for further work. A mathematical appendix
is included at the end of this paper.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Partial ownership
Partial Ownership (PO) consists in a firm acquiring a fraction of equity capital of a rival at the
horizontal level or of a supplier/manufacturer in a vertical relationship. The capital in partici-
pations does not generally give the majority of voting rights and in this case is a non-controlling
operation or silent participation (Reitman, 1994; Bresnahan and Salop, 1986). Thresholds or
ceilings in participations exist (usually at the 5%, 10%, 20% and 30% levels) and listed compa-
nies have to notify regulatory agencies when they cross these levels. The importance of partial
ownership is threefold. Firstly, the impact of partial ownership on competition is much studied
and is very important for antitrust regulation agencies. As for mergers (see e.g. Jullien and Rey,
2007; Compte et al., 2002) the collusive aspect of partial ownership causes a trade-off between
firms’ efficiency (profits) and reduced consumer surplus. Secondly, as for mergers more generally,
the study of incentives to engage in PO is also important. Similarly, there is an “outsider effect”
(Salant et al., 1983) when partial ownerships do not involve any synergies. Thirdly, the link
between participations and technological investment is also significant (see e.g Barcena-Ruiz and
Olaizola, 2007; Minetti et al., 2015).
The impact of PO on competition and market structure is substantial. Reynolds and Snapp
(1986) show that PO reduces output and increases prices in a Cournot model with barriers to
entry. Even when the amount of PO is small this result has anticompetitive effects similar to
those of mergers. O’Brien and Salop (2000) analyze the effects of POs in comparison to those of
mergers. They conclude that though passive participations do not carry corporate control they
may present anticompetitive aspects similar to those of mergers. Gilo et al. (2006) consider the
case of cross participations in a dynamic Bertrand model and conclude that tacit collusion can
be sustained in the long-run. In the case of vertically-related industries Jullien and Rey (2007)
study the impact of the resale price maintenance contract on collusion. Vertical contract models
are empirically tested by Bonnet and Dubois (2010). The issue of reinforced market power also
applies after the privatization of historically public companies and the subsequent liberalization
3
of the market (see e.g. Amundsen and Bergman, 2002; Lee and Hwang; 2003). In an application
to the US and Japanese automobile industries Alley (1997) derives empirical results confirming
the collusive effects of PO. In contrast, Malueg (1992) finds that in a dynamic Cournot framework
repeated interactions between competitors can produce less collusion. Further, other authors
study competitive aspects of participations either in a vertical supplier-dealer relationship or in
a mixed framework (see e.g. Greenlee and Raskovich, 2006; Serbera, 2010). Our article extends
the study of the competitive role of PO by introducing asymmetric CPO and leads to modified
results depending on whether or not CPO are used to prevent further concentration (takeovers).
2.2 Mergers and partial ownership
Allied to the above the explicit comparison of partial ownership and mergers is also of interest.
The literature on toehold acquisitions is significant. Acquiring participations prior to a merger
can be effective as it raises the cost of rival bids (see e.g. Bulow et al., 1999; Choi, 1991).
However, Betton et al. (2009) explain the recent decline in the number of toehold arrangements
by the need to acquire a sufficient amount of shares for the deal to be completed. Similarly,
Jovanovic and Wey (2014) find that the acquisition of equity participations into the capital of a
firm facilitates a later takeover – ultimately reinforcing market power. Fatica (2010) studies the
effects of POs prior to foreign direct investments. It is shown that toeholds can facilitate full
acquisition over a greenfield investment though the result depends on the value of investment
costs. Foros et al. (2011) investigate the effect of controlling participations on the pay-tv
industry in Scandinavia and find that the anti-competitive effects are potentially greater than
for full mergers.
Complex arrangements in cross participations are a practical reality and exist in various dif-
ferent forms worldwide. They have been much studied in the literature. Cases include horizontal
and vertical PO in the Cable TV industry in the US (Besen et al., 1999), “Keiretsu” in Japan
(Brown and Fung, 2009), “Deutschland AG” in Germany (Lantenois, 2011), “noyaux-durs” in
France (Goldstein, 1996), and “golden shares” in the United Kingdom (Yergin and Stanislaw,
1998). The study of these reciprocal participations can be compared with the effect of toeholds
on takeovers. However, in this case, the focus is on external takeovers incentives from outside
companies. This paper considers CPO as “golden shares” used as protection to guard against
foreign hostile takeovers. See Sections 3-4.
Defensive strategies against hostile buyouts are of great importance. Numerous defensive
strategies (also known as shark repellents such as “Pac-Man”, “Nancy Reagan”, “greenmail”, or
“white knight”) against hostile buyouts have been devised and implemented (see e.g. Barry and
Hatfield, 2012). Most of these takeover defences do not directly modify the capital structure of
the target. However, in the context of buy-outs, the question of capital appears to be crucial.
This motivates our study of the use of CPO as a defence to protect from a hostile takeover. We
highlight the defensive role of cross participations against hostile takeovers useful to protect na-
tional interest in strategic sectors. In addition, we demonstrate that bilateral partial ownerships
have a competitive impact as they may limit further market concentration. This important
innovation brings our model closer into line with financial reality and may also have important
regulatory implications. See Section 6.
4
3 The model: Takeovers in a Cournot oligopoly with cross par-
tial ownerships
Our analysis uses the traditional model of a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods that has
n≥1 firms f1, f2, . . . , fn∈F , n ∈ N (Tirole, 1988). Assuming a quadratic utility function for the
consumption qi of firm fi with associated price pi the homogeneous substitutability condition
gives pi(q) = a −
∑
k qk. Whilst an obvious simplification the homogeneous substitutability
condition seems to have empirical relevance to applications spanning the oil, automobile and
finance industries. See Section 5. Set up in this way this model arises as an important special
case of the classical model in Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Finally, firms’ marginal costs ci = c
are assumed constant.
Definition 1 A cross partial ownership is a mutual agreement in which two firms acquire cross
equity participations in each other’s capital structure.
(i) Cross partial ownership are silent participations (Reitman, 1994; Bresnahan and Salop,
1986), giving the acquirer no right in the other firm management decisions.
(ii) The cost of acquisition is a transfer price ti,j with fi, fj∈F is normalised∗ to zero.
Let βi,j ∈ [0, 0.5) denote the capital of firm fj held by firm fi. Two firms f1 and f2 say are
in a cross partial ownership agreement if β1,2 > 0 and β2,1 > 0. We write f1, f2∈CPO. The
special case βi,j = βj,1 = 0 represents a benchmark case and reduces to the traditional model of
a Cournot oligopoly without CPO (Tirole, 1988).
Profits for the two protected firms f1, f2∈CPO are given by Πi = (1 − βj,i)pii + βi,jpij ,
where pii = [pi(q)−c]qi, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The operating profit of an unprotected firm without equity
participations and representative of the majority of the industry is denoted by pir = [pr(q)−c]qr,
r≥3. The merger profit of a non-protected firm is given by ΠM = 2pir. The takeover profits on
a protected firm are given by Π′M = pir + Πi.
Definition 2 The type of ownership depends on if:
(i) The target is a firm with no CPO arrangement in which case it is an unprotected takeover.
(ii) The target is a firm with a CPO arrangement in which case it is a protected takeover.
We have two cases: pre-takeover and post-takeover. In the pre-takeover case there are n
firms and equilibrium values are denoted n. In the post-takeover case there are n− 1 firms and
we observe two possibilities: a takeover of an unprotected firm (denoted n−1) and a takeover
of a protected firm (denoted n−1,p). Benchmark values are denoted b. An illustration of the
organisation of the industry is shown below in Figure 1.
Pre-takeover. The n−2 firms with no CPO arrangements choose to maximise their individual
profit over qr:
pir = max
qr
{
(a−
∑
k
qk − c)qr
}
; qr =
a− c−∑k 6=r qk
2
(1)
For the two protected firms f1, f2∈CPO with i, j ∈ {1, 2} we have that
Πi = max
qi
{
(1− βj,i)[a−
∑
k
qk − c]qi + βi,j [a−
∑
k
qk − c]qj
}
.
∗The transfer price is thus independent of produced quantities and offset with each other when CPO are equal
as in the “golden shares” framework.
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Figure 1: Schematic model of hostile takeovers within an industry with cross partial ownership.
This can be solved to give the first-order conditions
∂Π1
∂q1
= −2q1(1− β2,1) + (1− β2,1)(a−
∑
k 6=1
qk − c)− β1,2q2 = 0
q1(2− 2β2,1) + q2(1 + β1,2 − β2,1) = (1− β2,1)(a−
∑
k/∈{1,2}
qk − c) (2)
∂Π2
∂q2
= −2q2(1− β1,2) + (1− β1,2)(a−
∑
k 6=2
qk − c)− β2,1q1 = 0
q2(2− 2β1,2) + q1(1 + β2,1 − β1,2) = (1− β1,2)(a−
∑
k/∈{1,2}
qk − c), (3)
since
∑
k 6=1 qk =
∑
k/∈{1,2} qk + q2 and
∑
k 6=2 qk =
∑
k/∈{1,2} qk + q1.
Takeover of an unprotected firm. The n− 4 firms with no CPO arrangement and outside of
the merger choose to maximise pir as per equation (1). The two protected firms f1, f2 ∈ CPO
maximise the partially joint profits Πi, i = 1, 2 given in (2-3). The two merged firms, f3 and f4
say, maximise their consolidated joint profit:
ΠM = max
q3,q4
{
(a−
∑
k
qk − c)q3 + (a−
∑
k
qk − c)q4
}
.
This gives
∂ΠM
∂q3
= (a−
∑
k 6=3
qk − c)− 2q3 − q4 = 0; 2q3 = a−
∑
k/∈{3,4}
qk − c = 2q4.
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Takeover of a protected firm. The n − 3 firms with no CPO arrangement and out of the
merger choose to maximise pir as per equation (1). The protected firm f1 is the target of a
takeover by a firm f3, say. The protected firm outside of the merger, f2 say, maximises the joint
profit shown in equation (3). Here, it is convenient to re-write this equation as
q2(2− 2β1,2) + q1(1 + β2,1 − β1,2) + q3(1− β1,2) = (1− β1,2)
(
a−
∑
k>3
qk − c
)
. (4)
The merged firm solves
max
q1,q3
Π′M = (1− β2,1)[a−
∑
k
qk − c]q1 + β1,2[a−
∑
k
qk − c]q2 + [a−
∑
k
qk − c]q3,
leading to the first-order conditions
∂Π′M
∂q1
= −2(1− β2,1)q1 + (1− β2,1)(a−
∑
k 6=1
qk − c)− β1,2q2 − q3 = 0
q1(2− 2β2,1) + q2(1 + β1,2 − β2,1) + q3(2− β2,1) = (1− β2,1)(a−
∑
k>3
qk − c) (5)
∂Π′M
∂q3
= −q1(1− β2,1)− β1,2q2 − 2q3 + (a−
∑
k 6=3
qk − c) = 0
q1(2− β2,1) + q2(1 + β1,2) + 2q3 = a−
∑
k>3
qk − c (6)
since
∑
k 6=1 qk =
∑
k>3 qk + q2 + q3 and
∑
k 6=3 qk =
∑
k>3 qk + q1 + q2.
4 Analytical results
In this section we establish the results of cross partial ownership both before and after the
takeover.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium values.) The equilibrium solution of the model is as follows:
(i) Pre-takeover case.
Πni =
(a− c)2(1− βj,i)
(n+ 1− βj,i − βi,j)2
pinr =
(a− c)2
(n+ 1− βj,i − βi,j)2
Benchmark
pin,br =
(a− c)2
(n+ 1)2
(ii) Post-takeover unprotected.
Πn−1i =
(a− c)2(1− βj,i)
(n− βj,i − βi,j)2
Πn−1M = pi
n−1
r =
(a− c)2
(n− βj,i − βi,j)2
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Benchmark
pin−1,br =
(a− c)2
n2
(iii) Post-takeover protected.
Πn−1,pM =
(1− β2,1)(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2
pin−1,p2 =
(1− β1,2)(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2
pin−1,br =
(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2
Benchmark
pin−1,br =
(a− c)2
n2
Proof
See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 confirms the collusive role of partial ownership (Reitman, 1994) and the “out-
sider effect” as the firms inside the CPO arrangement are worse off than the firms outside (Salant
et al., 1983). As with full mergers CPO reinforce the concentration in the industry leading to
an increase of market power and a strategic output’s reduction in the oligopoly. As a corollary
to Proposition 1 we obtain the following propositions:
Proposition 2 The impact of CPO upon profit margins is as follows:
(i) The CPO increases the profits of the wider industry outside the CPO.
(ii) The CPO reduces the combined profits of the firms inside the CPO.
Proof
(i) From Proposition 1 pinr is an increasing function of β1,2 and β2,1.
(ii) The combined profit of Firms 1-2 is
2−β1,2−β2,1
(n+1−β1,2−β2,1)2 which is a decreasing function of β1,2
and β2,1, since it is assumed we have n≥3 firms. 
Proposition 3 (Post Unprotected Takeover.) In the case of an unprotected takeover the
CPO have an anti-competitive impact as:
(i) The profit of the merged firm increases.
(ii) The incentives for an unprotected takeover are greater than in a benchmark industry.
Proof
From Proposition 1 the profit increases from (a−c)
2
(n+1−β1,2−β2,1)2 to
(a−c)2
(n−β1,2−β2,1)2 >
(a−c)2
n2
. 
Following a protected takeover define the takeover ratio to be the ratio of the profit of the
merged firm compared to the initial profit of the raider outside the original CPO agreement:
Protected Takeover Ratio :=
Πn−1,pM
pin3
=
(1− β2,1)2(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2
(n− β2,1 − β1,2)2 . (7)
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The economic interpretation of equation (7) is that values of β1,2 and β2,1 may be chosen to make
this ratio smaller – thus rendering the form less vulnerable to a hostile takeover. Proposition 4
shows that in an industry with CPO the incentives for a hostile takeover are reduced relative to
a benchmark industry.
Proposition 4 (Competition relative to a benchmark industry.) In an industry with a
CPO the incentives for a hostile takeover on a protected target are lower than in a benchmark
industry.
Proof
See the Appendix.
In the sequel we discuss the potential for asymmetric CPO to render hostile takeovers obsolete
by eroding the possibility of making surplus profits. This is a stronger condition and appears to
be chiefly of theoretical interest only. The implied thresholds appear to be violated by empirical
data. See Section 5.
Definition 3 An asymmetric CPO β1,2 and β2,1 is said to be effective against hostile takeovers
iff
Protected Takeover Ratio =
Πn−1,pM
pin3
=
(1− β2,1)(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2
(n− β2,1 − β1,2)2 < 1, (8)
where Πn−1,pM denotes the profit of the merged firm and pi
n
3 denotes the profit of the raider prior
to the merger.
Definition 3 thus enables us to pinpoint precisely when a CPO can protect against hostile
takeovers be reducing the profit levels that can be achieved by the raiding firm. The conditions
are prescribed in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5 An asymmetric CPO can be effective against hostile takeovers iff
Minimum Takeover Ratio :=
(1− β2,1)(n+ 1− β2,1)2
(n− β2,1)2 < 1. (9)
Proof
Since the takeover ratio defined in equation (7) is an increasing function of β1,2 the constraint
in equation (8) can only be satisfied for some β1,2 > 0 precisely when it is also satisfied at the
boundary condition β1,2 = 0. 
If a CPO is effective against hostile takeovers we can define the following protective CPO
threshold.
Proposition 6 (Protective CPO threshold.) If an asymmetric CPO β1,2 and β2,1 is effec-
tive against hostile takeovers then
0 < β1,2 < n+ 1− β2,1 −
(1 +
√
1− β2,1)
β2,1
,
provided
0 < n+ 1− β2,1 −
(1 +
√
1− β2,1)
β2,1
<
1
2
.
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Proof
If β1,2 = n+ 1− β2,1− (1+
√
1−β2,1)
β2,1
the Protected Takeover Ratio shown in equation (8) is equal
to 1. 
Following on from Propositions 4-6 an empirical application to CPOs as a defence against
hostile takeovers is given in Section 5.
5 Empirical application
In this section we compare the prediction given by (9) with empirical data on the “Deutschland
AG” and “noyaux-durs” policies much discussed in the academic literature (Franks and Mayer,
1998; Lantenois, 2011; Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998; Goldstein, 1996). See Table 3.
Observed β1,2 No. of major firms Observed β2,1 Minimal
Takeover
Ratio
Munich Re 0.2 6 Allianz 0.2 1.0996
Allianz 0.2 6 Munich Re 0.2 1.0996
Deutsche Bank 0.07 6 Allianz 0.05 1.2962
Allianz 0.05 6 Deutsche Bank 0.07 1.2701
Munich Re 0.023 6 Dresden Bank 0.083 1.2531
Dresden Bank 0.083 6 Munich Re 0.023 1.3313
UAP 0.1 10 BNP 0.1 1.0910
BNP 0.1 10 UAP 0.1 1.0910
ELF 0.04 10 Renault 0.015 1.1922
Renault 0.015 10 ELF 0.04 1.1624
ELF 0.02 10 BNP 0.01 1.1981
BNP 0.01 10 ELF 0.02 1.1862
Table 3: Minimal takeover ratios and compared to actual CPO values for Deutschland AG and
noyaux-durs arrangements.
Based on available data from the Bloomberg database results constructed in Table 3 cor-
respond to taking n = 6 large financial companies in Germany and n = 10 large French con-
glomerates across the oil, automobile and finance industries. Overall, results give a reasonable
reconstruction of empirical CPO arrangements given the extreme simplicity of the model. How-
ever, in each case the minimal takeover ratio exceeds 1. Thus, whilst CPO may play a valid role
in guarding against hostile takeovers and market concentration (see Section 6), real-world CPO
arrangements appear insufficient to fully deter hostile takeovers. However, it is also possible that
the transaction costs associated with real-world takeovers are sufficiently high that, in practice,
theoretical models may over-estimate the true value of the protective threshold required. In
this case results would suggest that in practice the level of profit required in order to undertake
takeovers may be around 20% higher than the value suggested by simple theoretical models.
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6 Regulation
In addition to literature results on the anticompetitive role of horizontal participations (see
e.g., Reitman, 1994; Gilo et al., 2006) alone or as a toehold before a full takeover (Jovanovic
and Wey, 2014), our analysis introduces the social benefits of CPO under certain conditions of
the model. Indeed, if protected by a CPO hostile takeovers become less profitable than in a
benchmark industry without CPO. Further, even higher levels of protection may be possible
if the Minimum Takeover Ratio shown in equation (9) is less than one. These results thus
have regulatory implications since, in both cases, they highlight the competitive role of cross
horizontal participations.
The use of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers was explored in Europe with the
“golden shares, “Deutschland AG or “noyaux-durs policy (Franks and Mayer, 1998; Lantenois,
2011; Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998; Goldstein, 1996). This policy defers to the regulation of the
European Commission and to the ruling the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of
a dispute. Special rights of the Union’s members on private undertakings are discussed and
examined to determine whether or not this is consistent with the free movement of capital and
payments. Lustig and Weil (2002) relate three ECJ rulings on participations and their link
with corporate governance. In Belgium the government holds shares in the “Socie´te´ Nationale
de Transport par Canalisation” as well as the “Socie´te´ de Distribution du Gaz SA”. The ECJ
granted the Belgian government the right to ask for notice or to oppose any decisions about
infrastructure changes if this runs counter to their strategic domestic interests. In France the
Minister of Economic Affairs was given, by means of a golden share, the right to oppose any
change in capital structure (i.e. crossings of the 10%, 20%, 33% thresholds for ‘Socie´te´ Nationale
Elf-Aquitaine’. This right was opposed by the ECJ in its ruling. Finally, the ECJ ruled against
Portugal in its use of participations to block foreign share acquisitions in recently privatised
companies. In these three cases the European Commission attacked these countries decision to
protect privatised companies using a defence in participations on the basis of an infringement
of the principle of the free movement of capital and payments. The theoretical justification of
such a “laissez-faire” policy is the belief that self-regulation of the market improves competition
and leads to more economic efficiency. However, in this particular case, the ruling against a
protection in CPO proves anti-competitive on the long run. We then suggest more competitive
regulation by allowing short-term market consolidation with CPO as a way to limit future hostile
takeovers that may ultimately have a more detrimental impact upon social welfare.
Our paper explores mathematically the competition approach on this topic, and our theoret-
ical results on the potential competitive role of CPO send a contrarian signal to the regulation
agencies and the courts. We argue that the regulators and governments should take a wider
view regarding the potential benefits of partial ownerships. Though CPO arrangements used
as a protection could be counter to the free movement of capital on markets, they should be
allowed under specific countries strategic circumstances (e.g. BAE-EADS merger deal vetoed
by the UK government) and also to prevent the increase of concentration and market power in
a particular industry.
7 Conclusions and discussion
This paper explores the theoretical study of the impact of CPO in the context of mergers. A
mixture of theoretical work (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O’Brien and Salop, 2000) and applied work
(see e.g. Perotti, 1992; Reiffen, 1998) investigate participations but does not explicitly link
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them with takeover incentives. Our contribution is also timely and relevant. Numerous articles
highlight the role and functioning of different forms of “golden shares” across several countries.
Examples include O’Brien and Salop (2000) in the US, Brown and Fung (2009) on Keiretsu,
Lantenois (2011) on ”Deutschland AG”, Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) on UK “golden shares”,
and Goldstein (1996) for French “noyaux-durs”. In addition, Jovanovic and Wey (2014) study
the role of CPO when takeovers offer synergies.
In this paper we study takeover incentives in a Cournot oligopoly model with two firms
linked by cross participations. The use of CPO can increase market concentration by offering
incentives for firms to takeover rivals. However, asymmetric CPO can also serve as an effective
defence against hostile takeovers by making the target less attractive. The implications for
competition policy are compelling. This competitive aspect is highlighted by a comparison of
takeover incentives between two industries – one with CPO and one benchmark industry without
such participations. Higher levels of protection may also be possible if the Minimum Takeover
Ratio shown in equation (9) is less than one. Since the full integration of a rival’s profits (buyout)
is more harmful in terms of competition than partial ownerships authorizing CPO could thus
prove socially beneficial.
This paper sheds new light on the analysis of competition and market power. It also raises
questions in the case of an “attack” and thus gives ample scope for additional investigations.
Results shown in Section 5 also shows that our model may have some empirical relevance across
a diverse range of industries. Future work will examine the consequences of cross participations
on protected firms’ incentives to raid competitors. This protection could be used in this case to
“attack” competitors. This could prove decisive in the analysis of the influence of CPO on market
concentration and on economic welfare. Other types of demand function with non-homogeneous
goods could allow for further extensions of the model to other settings e.g. Bertrand competition.
Further studies of equity strategies, against or in support of a buyout, may have important
implications both for policy makers in charge of the current regulatory monitoring process and
for continued applied research in the subject.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Summing (1) over the n− 2 firms outside the CPO gives
2
∑
k/∈{1,2}
qk = (n− 2)(a− c)− (n− 3)
∑
k/∈{1,2}
qk − (n− 2)(q1 + q2) (10)
Adding (10) and equations (2-3) gives∑
k
qk =
n− β2,1 − β1,2
n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2 (a− c). (11)
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It follows from equation (11) that
qr =
a− c
2
−
∑
k qk
2
+
qr
2
; qr =
a− c
n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2 (12)
pinr = [a−
∑
k
qk − c]qr = (a− c)
2
(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2 (13)
It follows from equations (11-12) that
q1 + q2 + (n− 2)qr = (n− β2,1 − β1,2)(a− c)
n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2 ; q1 + q2 =
(2− β2,1 − β1,2)(a− c)
n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2 . (14)
Combining (11) and equations (2-3) it follows that
qi =
(1− βj,i)(a− c)
n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2 ; Π
n
i =
(1− βj,i)(a− c)2
(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2 .
(ii) Since in this case the n − 3 outside of the CPO solve the optimisation problem shown in
equation (1) this reduces to Case (i) discussed above with n replaced by n− 1.
(iii) Summing (1) over the n− 3 firms outside the CPO and outside of the merger gives
(n− 3)(q1 + q2 + q3) = (n− 3)(a− c)− (n− 2)
∑
k>3
qk. (15)
Summing equations (4-6) and (15) gives
(n+ 1− β1,2 − β2,1)
∑
k
qk + (1− β2,1)q1 + β1,2q2 + q3 = (n− β1,2 − β2,1)(a− c)
(n+ 1− β1,2 − β2,1)
∑
k
qk + (a−
∑
k
qk − c) = (n− β1,2 − β2,1)(a− c)
where the second equality follows from equation (6). This gives∑
k
qk =
(
n− 1− β1,2 − β2,1
n− β1,2 − β2,1
)
(a− c). (16)
Combining equations (1) and (16) gives
qr = (a−
∑
k
qk − c) = (a− c)
n− β1,2 − β2,1 ; pir =
(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2
From equations (4) and (5) it follows that
Πn−1,p2 =
(1− β1,2)(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2 ; Π
n−1,p
M =
(1− β2,1)(a− c)2
(n− β1,2 − β2,1)2

Proof of Proposition 4
We show that the takeover ratio given by equation (7) is less than the corresponding value
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of (n+1)
2
n2
in a benchmark industry. Firstly, it is easy to show, e.g. by taking logarithms and
differentiating, that equation (7) is an increasing function of β1,2. This gives that
(1− β2,1)(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2
(n− β2,1 − β1,2)2 <
(n+ 12 − β2,1)2
(n− 12 − β2,1)2
Since the right hand side is an increasing function of β2,1 it follows that we must have that
(1− β2,1)(n+ 1− β2,1 − β1,2)2
(n− β2,1 − β1,2)2 <
n2
(n− 1)2 <
(n+ 1)2
n2

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